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The  Mid-Term  Review  and  the  Health  Check  reforms  of  the  EU’s  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
include numerous options for national implementation of the Single Payment Scheme. After the far-
reaching  decoupling  of  Direct  Payments,  further  reforms  and  changes  of  support  measures  are 
necessary  with  respect  to  the  financial  guidelines  to  be  established  for  the  period  after  2013. 
Referring to Germany, the principles of the hybrid and regional models and their effects on the 
distribution of direct payments are shown. With regard to CAP after 2013, the impacts of alternative 
payment options are analysed based on farm individual FADN data of EU-27. Options of digressive 
premium schemes, including capping wrt labour input, regionalised or EU-wide flat rates, lowering 
the premium level and the partial transfer of Pillar-I in favour of Pillar-II is analysed.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Direct payments (DP) were introduced by the McSharry reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in 1992. At first they were targeted to compensate for income losses due to reduced 
price support. Since then they have been extended towards other sectors and decoupled in the Mid-
term review (Single Payment Scheme: SPS). The last reform step, the Health Check, included the 
phasing-out of milk quotas, a further reduction of partial decoupling and manifold national options for 
redistribution  of  Direct  Payments.  Capping  measures  were  proposed  several  times  by  the  EU 
Commission (Kleinhanss and Manegold, 1998) but were never established due to strong opposition by 
the  Member  States’  (MS)  governments.  However,  such  measures  still  exist  in  the  US  Farm  Bill 
(Thompson, 2010). 
The DP budget is determined in the financial guidelines until 2013. Discussions aiming at the 
preparation of CAP for the next financial period (after 2013) are in progress. A communication of the 
EU Commission (2010) on the future CAP was submitted in November 2010. National positions are 
quite  different  and  range  from  the  maintaining  or  slight  modification  of  existing  schemes, 
simplification, further harmonisation of DP levels between MS and partial or full transformation in 
favour of Pillar-II (Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, 2008; Bureau and Mahé, 2008; Heißenhuber et al., 
2008; Zahrnt, 2008, 2009). A far reaching proposal has been worked out by an expert group involved 
in a study for the European Parliament, with a transitory payment scheme until 2020 and a general 
reorientation towards public goods afterwards (Bureau et al., 2010). Within this study, alternative 
options for DP schemes were analysed by the author based on EU-FADN data. Although FADN is  
representative wrt to standard gross margins, representation is less wrt to land use, DP and other 
subsidies. However, it’s the best available data base for an analysis of distribution effects of DP 
schemes including (static) income effects.  
The paper covers the following DP options: flat rates per ha of UAA, differentiated by MS or 
unified at EU-27 level. Premiums are reduced depending on the premium level of farms equal to the Ancona - 122
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already established Modulation scheme, combined by capping of DP referring to labour input. In other 
scenarios we assume doubling
1 parameters of the Modulation scheme and a reduction of global budget 
by 20 %. The partial transformation of 50 % of DP (Pillar-I: P-I) in favour of Pillar-II (P-II) gives 
some  indication  of  income  effects  of  such  far-reaching  reforms,  but  does  not  provide  answers 
regarding the specification, uptake of voluntary measures of P-II and their overall effects.  
2.  MODELLING APPROACH AND SCENARIOS   
The  analysis  of  alternative  DP  options  is  inspired  by  a  study  for the European Parliament 
(Bureau et al., 2010) proposing a two-step procedure: a) progressive reduction of P-I until 2020, b) 
increasing  budget  for  P-II,  i.e.,  public  money  for  the  provision  of  public  goods.  Based  on  this 
experience the modelling approach has been extended to deal with options included in communication 
for a further reform of CAP after 2013 of the Commission. Option 2 of this proposal – referring to 
Direct  Payments  -  includes  the  following  measures  under  the  objective  of  ‘a  fairer  distribution 
between the Member States’:    
·  a base payment serving as income support  
·  a  compulsory  complementary  aid  wrt  environmental  measures  partly  compensating  for 
additional costs  
·  complementary payments to balance more specially natural restrictions  
·  an optional coupled support component for special sectors and regions 
·  introduction of a new regulation for small farms  
·  capping wrt large-scale enterprises and employment in the rural area. 
Some  of  these  options  can  be  interpreted  as  digressive  payments  referring  to the premium 
volume of farms. In the analysis we define premium digression equal to the existing Modulation 
scheme and a further limitation wrt labour input.   
The  harmonisation  of  DP  between  regions  and  Member  States  could  be  realised  via 
regionalised entitlement levels as in Germany and England. In the analysis we assume unified flat 
rates at the Member State or whole EU level
2. A transformation of Pillar-I funding to the Pillar-II 
budget is considered as follows: DP reduced by 50 % and the remaining 50 % transferred to Pillar-II, 
were  the  former  is  affected  by  the  digressive  measures.  A  last  option,  not  considered  in  the 
Commission proposal, is a general reduction of the budget. We assume a 20 % cut of the global 
budget. Such a budget cut seems to be reasonable wrt budget requirements for future global policy 
targets (i.e., environment, biodiversity, etc). It is also proven by the fact that the DP budget has been 
determined by CAP reforms since 1991 and it is hard to imagine that the budget level of 2013 can be 
maintained forever.  
Based  on  2007  FADN  data,  simulations
3  were  realised  referring  to  2013  assuming  a  full 
national implementation of decoupling and a complete upgrading of DP levels in the new Member 
states (nMS). A comparative static simulation model is developed to assess impacts of different direct 
                                                       
1  With the exception of the franchise of 5 T€ (T: thousand). 
2  Regional or EU-uniform flat rates per hectare are derived from the premium budget of EU member states or EU-27 together. Ancona - 122
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payment schemes on the premium level and income. In a first step, gross premium levels (excluding 
compulsory and voluntary Modulation) are calculated for 2007. Then, a projection of premiums for 
2013 is made, including the regional implementation of decoupling in Germany and England, as well 
as the upgrading of premium levels in the new Member States. Target year for the analysis is 2013, 
assuming a full upgrading of direct payments also in Bulgaria and Romania. Premium totals per MS 
derived from EU-FADN are calibrated to national premium budget
4 and UAA represented by FADN.  
Projected direct payments or incomes referring to national implementation in 2013 are taken as 
reference for the comparison of alternative DP options. The following options were considered: 
·  DP  transformed  into  uniform  flat  rates  per  ha  of  UAA  at  Member  State  or  EU-27  level, 
combined with premium digression per farm depending on premium level and labour input 
(10 % > 5 T€ + 4 % > 300 T€ and capping (<= 15 T€ per worker (AWU) for DP > 50 T€)
5. 
·  Reduction of P-I payments by half and transformation of the remaining DP into P-II  payments
6. 
For the P-I part, the above mentioned digressive elements are applied, which is not the case for 
P-II volume. Concerning income effects we assume 100 % transfer efficiency for P-I payments, 
while  only  40 %  for  P-II  payments  (Goemann  et  al.,  2009).  Co-financing  of  
P-II payments is not considered. 
Based on these criteria the following scenarios are defined, each differentiated by flat rates per 
MS/EU and +/- capping wrt labour input:  
Scenario   Digression   Global budget level EU
7 
Sc_1:   equal to Modulation + capping  constant 
Sc_2:  doubling Modulation + capping   constant 
Sc_3:  equal to Modulation + capping  -20 % 
Sc_4:  doubling Modulation + capping  -20 % 
 
Partial impacts of above-mentioned scenarios are derived referring to national implementation 
of decoupling (excluding Modulation). Further, income effects are assessed using farm net income 
plus wage expenditures as income indicator
8.  The results are weighted with aggregation factors and 
aggregated to sector accounts.  
The premium budget of EU-27 for P-I in 2013
9 amounts to 46 billion €. Flat rates per ha of 
UAA derived from statistical data vary between 83 €/ha in Latvia and 575 €/ha in Greece. An EU-
wide uniform flat rate would amount to 266.3 €/ha.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
3  The data base includes roughly 81 T farms, representing roughly 5.4 million farms in EU-27. 
4  Ongoing implementation of the Health Check decisions and remaining steps of the reforms of the Common market regimes for sugar, 
tobacco, olive oil, cotton, fruit and vegetables are implicitly considered by calibration. 
5  Parameters are determined by the author; variations can easily be introduced in the simulation model.  
6  Analysis of P-II options is rather difficult, as P-II payments are not at all representative in EU-FADN. Further, there is not enough 
information required for the specification of P-II measures or the potential application of voluntary measures.     
7  Reduction of net payments by Modulation / capping are considered as net savings of EU budget. 
8  This indicator is necessary for income comparisons between private and legal farms.  
9  DP plafond for Bulgaria and Romania in 2016 is assumed to be implemented in 2013   Ancona - 122
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3.  EFFECTS OF THE REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPS IN GERMANY 
To get an idea of the distribution effects of regional flat rates, changes of premiums are  shown 
for the implementation of the regional model in Germany in comparison to a projection of the hybrid 
model based on 2007 data.  
3.1.  The national implementation  
In  Germany,  the  SPS  was  implemented  in  2005  with  an  almost  full  decoupling  of  direct 
payments. In a first step a regional equilibration of premium volume is being carried out between the 
Laender, changing the former Laender budget by -5 to +14 %. The gradual transformation over time is 
being realised by a hybrid model. Regionalised area-related payment claims are combined with farm 
individual top-ups being based on the main part of the livestock premia and on the total of milk and 
sugar premia. In 2005, the level of payment claims for arable land (including land set-aside) was 
about EUR 300/ha, while for grassland it was about EUR 80/ha. Provided that a farm raised eligible 
animals or produced milk or sugar beets in the reference period, the remaining premiums derived are 
added as so-called top-ups on the entitlements for arable and grassland (with the exception of set-
aside). The level of the payment claims remains constant until 2009 (except the dynamic adaptation 
from the upgrading of milk and sugar premia --> static hybrid model). From 2010, a progressive 
adaptation  of  the  levels  of  the  payment  claims  (dynamic  hybrid  model)  occurs  up  to  the  full 
harmonisation in 2013.  
Referring to a hypothetical static hybrid model in 2013, the premium level would be less than 
200 €/ha for 5 % of UAA (Salhofer et al, 2009). For about 75 % of UAA it varies between 200 and 
400 €/ha and for about 5 % of UAA it is more than 500 €/ha (Figure 1). The latter applies in particular 
for farms with intensive bull fattening and milk production. After full conversion to regional flat rates, 
the payment levels vary in the scope of administratively settled levels of 280 and 380 €/ha. About one 
quarter of farms can expect considerably higher premiums, while in one fifth of farms with intensive 
cattle and milk production, considerable premium losses are to be expected.  Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
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Figure 1. Distribution of entitlement levels related to UAA – hybrid  versus regional flat rates 
(2013) Germany 
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Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.  
 
3.2.  Analysis of the effects of the SPS  
The evaluations and model calculations were carried out for balanced samples of farms for the 
period 2004 (financial year 2003/4) to 2009 (2008/9) drawn from the national FADN. In the first two 
financial years, exclusively coupled direct payments were granted. The decoupled payments within 
the scope of the hybrid model are reflected first in 2006 (financial year 2005/6). Starting from 2010, a 
projection of premiums of the dynamic hybrid model as well as for the regional model in 2013 is 
made. The farms are selected by orientation of production and grouped by size classes
10.  
The development of direct payments between 2004 and 2009, as well as the changes to be 
expected by 2013 compared to 2009, are shown in Figure 2. In the first phase, the development is 
gradually influenced by adjustments of milk and sugar premia:  
·  As a result of the introduction and the upgrading of the milk premiums, a near doubling of DPs 
arises for dairy farms with up to 100 dairy cows. For the bigger farms, the increase is only half, 
because of larger arable areas and diversification. The milk market reform is also reflected in 
                                                       
10   
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the premium increase of farms with up to 50 bulls that often pursue bull fattening combined 
with milk production.  
·  The introduction and the upgrading of the sugar beet premiums is reflected in an increase of 
direct payments for arable farms of size class 2 to 4.  
 
Figure 2. Development of DP by type and size of farms (% of 2009) 
 
 
The adjustment of payment claims by 2013 differs by farm types:  
·  For arable farms with up to 40 ESU (European Size Unit) as well as for legal entities located in 
the  east, the premium level rises by up to 10 %, while it decreases for the remaining size 
classes.  
·  Small dairy farms will get slightly higher premia, mainly due to the upgrading of grassland 
entitlements. This is also valid for size class 5 which lies above all in the eastern region, with 
larger  and  more  diversified  UAA.  However,  farms  dominant  in  West  Germany  with  25  to 
100 cows have to expect premium losses of about 10 to 20 %.  
·  Farms specialised in bull fattening will have premium losses of 20 to 40 % by 2013. Including 
the premium adaptation that had already occurred in 2009, the premium volume decreases to 
about half compared to the previous system with coupled premiums.  
·  Farms with suckler cows have to expect premium increases of up to 12 % by 2013; they profit 
above all from the introduction and upgrading of the payment claims for grassland.  
It can be seen that the regional implementation of the SPS leads to considerable redistributions 
of DPs to the disadvantage of intensive beef fattening and dairy farms. Also, a moderate regional 
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4.  IMPACTS OF DP OPTIONS WRT CAP AFTER 2013  
To  indicate  the  combined  effects  of  premium  rearrangements,  digression  and  capping  with 
reference to manpower, the premium changes are shown in the following graphs as a function of 
premium volumes per farm (referring to national implementation).  
4.1.  Impacts in Germany 
In  Germany,  redistributions  were  mainly  be  realised  during  national  implementation of the 
regional model mentioned before. Distributions induced by a country wide flat rate are rather low, 
shown in the top line of Figure 3. Farms with premium levels up to 5 T€ will have a slight increase of 
DP, because of their location in regions with weak natural conditions being favoured by an upgrading 
of entitlements. On the other hand, they are exempted from digression due to the franchise. Premium 
digression  would  impose  a  slightly  progressive  reduction  of  DP  up  to  12 %.  Parameters  of  the 
digression  scheme  in  Scenario_1  are  equal to existing Modulation and therefore representing the 
present situation (with the exception of DP transfers towards P-II and national co-financing of P-II 
programmes). Capping of DP wrt labour use would impose premium reductions up to 35 % in farms 
with DP levels beyond 200 T€. Although defined for DP > 50 T€, farms with less than 100 T€ are less 
affected due to their average labour input of 2 AWU. Larger farmers in Germany are more specialised 
in arable cropping with low labour input. Therefore DP are much higher than the underlying ceiling of 
15 T€/AWU. Due to expected large reductions of DP there is strong opposition against this measure, 
especially  by  representatives  of  the  new  Laender.  Nevertheless,  such  a  measure  seems  to  be 
reasonable, because almost all measures related to labour use have been abandoned by decoupling, 
meaning that especially livestock production in the new Laender is further reduced, inducing negative 
employment effects.  
By  an  EU-wide  flat  rate  the  DP  level  would  be  reduced  by  23 %  on  average.  Including 
Modulation (Sc_1) it will decrease up to 31 % without and up to 42 % with capping. 
 
Figure 3. DP options Sc_1 Germany 































Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.
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The doubling of parameters of Modulation (Sc_2) would increase the digression by DP level 
with reductions up to 20 % by the linear element and up to 42 % including capping wrt labour input 
(Figure 4). A reduction of global the budget by 20 % (Sc_3) would induce even higher premium 
reductions  especially  for  small  and  medium  sized  farms.  The  capping effect wrt labour becomes 
lower, such that the maximum reduction will be 47% for the largest farms.   
 
Figure 4. DP Options Germany 





































































































As the average DP level in Germany, with 345 €/ha, is significantly above the EU average, an 
EU-wide flat rate of 266 €/ha would induce considerable DP losses. The DP level would be reduced 
by 23 % on average. Including Modulation and capping (Sc_1) it will decrease up to 30 % without, 
and  to  42 %  with,  capping.  Doubling  modulation  (Sc_2)  would  enforce  the  digression  and  DP 
reductions up to 40 % without, and up to 48 % with, capping. A further 20 % budget cut would induce 
DP reductions of 35 to 40 % in medium sized farms and up to 55 % in largest farms (Sc_4). It has to 
be mentioned, that the partial capping impact is much lower under this lower DP level.   
4.2.  EU wide effects of DP options  
Effects  of  DP  options  on  net-DP at MS levels are shown in Figure 5 referring to average 
payment levels; for simplification we take only Sc_1 into account. MS are sorted by gross DP levels 
in the base situation and aggregated into EU-15 and nMS. DP levels show a broad variation between 
570 (Greece) and 170 €/ha (Portugal) in EU-15 and 490 (Malta) and 83 €/ha (Latvia) in the nMS. 
Depending on farm size DP are reduced up to 10 % by digression. Partial impacts are less in nMS due 
to lower DP levels and sometimes high shares of small farms. A further capping referring to labour 
input would especially affect Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom.  Ancona - 122
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EU-wide flat rates would induce considerable redistribution effects between MS. In the EU-15, 
two-thirds of MS could expect considerable DP losses, while in the nMS two-thirds would gain. 
Partial effects of Modulation and capping on net-payments are about 10 to 30 €/ha
11.   
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Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.  
 
Aggregated  effects  for  MS  of  EU-15  mainly  applying  historic  or  hybrid  schemes
12  in  the 
reference as well as the nMS mainly applying SAPS are shown in Figures 6 and 7. As premium 
reductions/capping  are  progressive  with  DP  levels  of  farms,  results  are  aggregated  for  farms  by 
different payment classes.  
Impacts  of  flat  rates  in  EU-15  Member  States  (excl.  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom) 
applying historical references are very important; distribution effects are similar as in Germany due to 
the implementation of the regional model (see Chapter 3). Farms with low premium levels will gain a 
lot. Net payments of farms with 20 to 200 T€ premiums will progressively decrease up to 25 %, while 
larger farms will lose up to two-thirds.  
Modulation and capping (Sc_1) would include a further reduction of net-payments by 10 and 
20 %, respectively. The partial effect of doubling modulation parameters is about -10 %-points. DP 
will be reduced further by a 20 % budget cut; while small farms will gain, large farms will have 
drastic DP losses.  
EU wide flat rates will have a further negative levelling effect because two-thirds of EU-15 
MS have DP levels above EU-27 average; the gross DP level will be reduced by 11 %. Only farms 
with less than 5 T€ will be on the winner side, while even farms with 10 to 50 T€ of DP will have 
premium losses up to 25 %. Losses will progressively increase to more than 75 % in the largest farms.   
                                                       
11 The partial effects of a partial harmonisation of flat rates within the EU would lay between the boundaries set by flat rates at MS and EU 
levels.  
12 Impacts of DP options in the UK are similar to Germany and are not shown here.   Ancona - 122
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In the nMS, effects of national flat rates are rather insignificant as most of them apply the 
Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) (Figure 7). Modulation under Sc_1 would induce effective 
premium  losses,  as  Modulation  was  not  used  before  2013.  Net-payments  will  be  progressively 
reduced up to 12 % or up to 20 % including capping. It has to be mentioned, that the partial effects of 
capping are rather low, which is due to the higher labour input and of labour cost considerably below 
assumed upper limits of 15 T€/ AWU. Doubling Modulation parameters would enforce the digression 
effect with DP reductions up to 25 %. Budget cuts of 20 % would induce further DP losses but reduce 
the effect of digression.   
The total harmonisation of DP-levels between MS via EU-wide flat rates would be in favour 
of most nMS; the gross DP-level would increase by one-third on average. Small farms will gain a lot. 
Farms with DP of 10 to 20 T€ would get 25 to 15 % higher net-premiums under Sc_1 and Sc_2. Due 
to  digression  and  capping  large  farms  would  have  up  to  12  and  25 %  lower  premiums  under 
conditions of underlying scenarios. With a 20 % reduction of the global budget, small farms will still 
be on the winner side; net-payments in medium sized farms would be slightly negative, while largest 
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4.3.  Income effects of digression and budget transfers of P-I towards P-II   
The effect of this measure can only be shown wrt income effects, because transfer efficiency of 
P-II is assumed to be only 40 % against 100 % for P-I. Income effects are expressed referring to farm 
net income plus expenditures for hired workers. It is also assumed that premium changes of P-I as 
well  as  Modulation  and  capping  directly  affect  income.  The  income  indicator  used,  with 
approximately 125 billion €, is about three times the level of direct payments, therefore the relative 
changes are lower in comparison to premium changes shown before. The analysis will focus on the 
option ‘transferring 50 % of DP in favour of P-II’ referring to an EU-wide flat rate.  
Aggregated income effects are explained for Germany, first referring to 2007 income, where 
other parameters except DP remain unchanged (Figure 8; Sc_1). For completion of above mentioned 
effects it also shows income effects of the digression schemes. Although EU flat rates are applied, 
income in small farms increases slightly. Reasons are the exemption from Modulation and a low share 
of DP on income. Incomes will progressively be reduced up to 15 % without and up to 22 % with 
capping referring to labour input.  
Due to lower transfer efficiency the partial transfer of P-I towards P-II would induce higher 
income losses from 2 to 25 % in medium sized farms (DP levels of 7 and 25 T€) and of one-third at 
maximum. It has to mentioned that the partial effect of capping is rather insignificant even for farms 
with more than 300 T€ of DP. Due to halving P-I payments capping effects can be almost outbalanced 
with the assumed ceiling of 15 T€/AWU.  
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Figure  8.  Combined  income  effects  of  an  EU-wide  flat  rate,  shifting  toward  Pillar-II  and 










Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.


















































Income effects EU-15 (excluding Germany) as well for nMS are shown in Figure 9. Regarding 
digression of P-I (Sc_1) small farms in EU-15 will get up to 10 % higher incomes. Income will 
progressively  be  reduced  up  to  20 %  in  farms  with  up  to  300 T€  and  up  to  one-third  including 
capping. The partial transfer of P-I via P-II will induce 5 % higher income losses in small and largest 
farms and of -10 to -15 in farms with 10 to 100 T€. Budget cuts of 20 % induce further income losses 
as shown in the bottom of Figure 9.  
Income effects in the nMS are generally positive, due to the combined effects of upgrading DP 
since 2007 and due to EU-wide flat rates. Further, they are less affected by digression and capping. 
Under Sc_1 income increases by 25 % under the digression scheme and by 12 % with the partial 
transfer  of  P-I  budget.  Under  conditions  of  Sc_4,  relative  income  effects  are  about  half.  Income 
changes are almost similar between farms with DP of 2 to 300 T€. Only farms with <1 T€ and > 
300 T€ would have rather insignificant increases of income. Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
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Figure 9. Income effects of an EU-wide flat rate, shifting towards Pillar-II and Modulation and 
capping depending on DP level of farms  
Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.












































































































































50 % of P-I
Digression + capping
Transfer 





















4.4.  Impacts on the distribution of DP by farms and labour units 
Finally the questions arises in which degree the distribution of direct payments changes and if a 
fairer distribution – as mentioned in the Commissions’ communication – can be reached. This will be 
discussed in comparing distributions of the base situation (national implementations of SPS) and EU-
wide flat rates under conditions of Sc_4 (20 % budget cut, doubling Modulation including capping) 
over the whole EU-27 (see Figure 10). The distribution in the base situation (left side) shows 3 pikes: 
one in farms with less than 5 T€ of DB and low rates referring to labour use. Another pike with 
around 10 to 15 T€ of DP/AWU is for farms with DP levels of 20 to 100 T€ and a further one with 30 
and more T€/AWU for DP levels of > 200 T€/farm. 
Under condition of Sc_4 with an EU-wide flat rate the distribution seems to be more balanced, 
but the 3 pikes are still there. The share of farms with 5 to 10 T€/AWU increases significantly in the 
group with than 5 T€ of DP. On the other side the shares of farms with high DP/AWU decrease in Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
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large farms. Therefore, distribution of DP is still unbalanced, because it is mainly determined by the 
variation of farms size, especially land use.  
 





























































































Reference Scenario 4 (Flat rate EU)
Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The simulation based on FADN data allows conclusions on the effects of alternative options of 
decoupled payment schemes. Regional flat rates by MS lead to premium rearrangements within the 
MS, especially of EU-15, mainly in favour of farms with a low premium volume in the base situation. 
Redistribution  effects  are  close  to  the  German  regional  model,  which  is  to  the  disadvantage  of 
intensive beef fattening and dairy farms and a moderate regional redistribution in favour of extensive 
and grassland-based cattle farms, as well as less favoured regions.  
Uniform EU-wide flat rates induce clear re-distributions to the disadvantage of the main part of 
EU-15 countries and in favour of most new Member States. Premium ceilings with respect to labour 
would lead to significant premium reductions for farms with more than 100 T€ of direct payments, 
above  all  in  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  new  Member  States  only  relatively  low 
reductions arise from this alternative, due to the higher labour input of those farms.  
Providing public money for public goods is a general guideline recommended by policy makers, 
interest  groups  and  scientists.  Model  calculations  based  on  the  transformation  of  half  of  Pillar I 
premiums  in  favour  of Pillar-II (without considering co-financing) show above all strong income 
losses in the bigger farms, because the transfer efficiency of Pillar-II payments with respect to income 
is possibly less than half compared to Pillar-I payments.  Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
“Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
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